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ABSTRACT
Market transparency, in its most succint form, refers to the level of current trade information revealed to
the public by market makers. We analyze the effect of market transparency on the outcomes of postedoffer style B2B markets under both stationary and non-stationary demand conditions. We find that sellers
on average can extract significantly higher surplus than buyers, yet the difference decreases with
increasing market transparency. Also, poor price-tracking ability of the posted-offer market after an
external demand shock hurts buyers only. Seller profits are much less sensitive to the shock compared to
buyer surpluses.
Keywords: e-commerce, market transparency, experimental analysis, simulation
INTRODUCTION
Proliferation of the Internet has led to development of many types of online markets, including electronic
exchanges, net marketplaces, e-hubs, clearinghouses, and private industrial networks. The design and
implementation of these markets require vital decisions about ownership, structure, and procedures. The
transparency of a market, in this respect, is profoundly important and can by itself lead to market failure if
not managed properly. The issue is more complicated for online markets because the main objective of
these markets is to aggregate many buyers and sellers around the world. Since the level of transparency
may deter one or both of the groups, market makers should find the optimal transparency level to
maximize participation, liquidity, and revenues.
This paper investigates the effects of transparency on market outcomes within the context of a
simulated posted-offer market framework. The primary objective is to gain insights regarding the impact
of transparency on (i) the rents earned by buyers and sellers, (ii) mean prices, and (iii) market efficiency
under both stationary and non-stationary demand conditions. The lack of definite analytical results in this
topic reflects the complexity of interactions of the variables in electronic markets. Given this complexity,
studying transparency with controlled experiments becomes a useful approach. In this study, we first
propose an economic experiment, and detail the design and procedures to be followed. We, then, report
the findings of a complementary simulation analysis we conducted by using proprietary software
developed at the Krannert School of Management, Purdue University.
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Laboratory markets: methodology and implementation
Two major advantages of experimental analysis are replicability and control. Replicability is the notion
that any researcher can reproduce the conditions described by another researcher, and can expect to verify
the reported phenomenon (Davis and Ramagopal 1998). Control is related with whether an observation in
an environment can be attributed to nothing else but the induced incentives. In our proposed experiment,
control is maintained by the abstract commodity, which has value only in the experiment. Therefore,
outcome predictions arise only from the elements included in the design. Due to space restrictions, this
proposal briefly describes our experimental design and procedures. The complete set of user instructions,
algorithms, and derivation of supply and demand schedules are available upon request.
Buyer and seller behavior in posted-offer markets
Past research indicates that sellers have considerable strength over buyers in posted-offer markets
(Ketcham et al. 1984). Ineffectiveness of strategic buyer behavior in posted-offer institutions is further
illustrated by the results of Cason and Williams (1990). They show that buyers perform poorly in
manipulating prices compared to sellers. In particular, whenever a buyer chooses not to make a profitable
transaction, others that shop subsequently perform that transaction, eliminating any possible effect on the
total quantity transacted. Sellers, on the other hand, engage in price signaling in a more successful
manner. It is the strength of sellers as well as myopically optimal behavior of buyers that makes postedoffer institution more suited to analyzing seller behavior. In this research, therefore, we simulate buyer
behavior and use human subjects for sellers. Simulating buyers may be further justified by the fact that
buyers are many and dispersed in most markets.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
The market framework in this study comprises multiple sellers who repeatedly post prices for their
undifferentiated homogeneous good. The number of buyers and sellers and their capacities are constant
during the course of each simulation run, and there is no entry into or exit from the market. In what
follows, a cohort is a group of four subjects who always trade together. A market is a sequence of trading
rounds with a cohort in the same regime with the same parameters. A session is a 3-hour period during
which a cohort participates in a series of market regimes.
Subjects and incentives
Each seller subject attends an initial training session and receives detailed instructions, a copy of which is
available upon request. Sellers earn laboratory currency through their trading decisions, which is later
converted to real dollars, and paid them at the end of the experiment. Such an incentive ensures that
sellers behave rationally with the goal of maximizing their profits. There is no penalty for failing to sell,
except that they make no profit in that session. At the start of each trading period, each seller is given an
initial endowment of 3 units of a homogeneous good.
The institution
B2B exchanges have two dominant market mechanisms: buyer catalogs and dynamic pricing tools, such
as auctions. Since our main focus is on the catalog sales where prices are posted for buyer search, the
posted-offer institution is a suitable economic environment for our purposes. In order to observe how
seller behavior changes under different levels of information revelation, trading rules of the institution are
varied to generate Transparent, Opaque, and Semi-transparent markets (see the next section for details).
As in all posted-offer institutions, sellers in our setting post prices and buyers make ‘take-it-orleave-it’ purchase decisions based on these posted prices. Each buyer (seller) has a marginal value (cost)
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representing the value (cost) of consuming (producing) that unit. These valuations and costs yield
aggregate market demand and supply schedules as described in Ketcham et al. (1984). Sellers earn
experimental cash rewards by selling a commodity at a price that is higher than its marginal cost. Induced
valuation and cost assignments are kept strictly private in all sessions. Subjects are isolated at computer
terminals, and no communication is allowed outside the rules imposed by the institution.
Each session consists of the following sequence of events. First, sellers learn their production costs,
and decide on the price and quantity to produce at that price (limited by their capacities). Sellers are not
restricted in their price choices, and production is made-to-order in the sense that cost is incurred only
when a unit is sold. Buying sequence begins once all prices are posted. Simulated buyers accept offers as
long as a product is priced below their valuations, and it is available. They purchase in a mechanic way,
starting with the cheapest unit, and continue purchasing higher priced units.
Market treatments
The experiment employs the market treatments shown in Table 1. The treatment variable is transparency,
that is, the level of information revealed to subjects. The variable is explored in three levels by varying
information revelation rules of the institution.
In the transparent market, whenever a transaction is conducted in the market, trade details are
presented in the public transaction history window of each seller. For each transaction listed in this
window, the identities of the buyer and the seller are presented, along with the transaction size and the
price at which the transaction is cleared. In addition, sellers’ own transactions are also separately
displayed in their private transaction history windows. In the opaque market, information about other
sellers’ prices or availability is not publicly available. The only information sellers see is the details of
their own transactions, i.e., price, quantity, and trader identity. Semi-transparent market provides more
information than opaque market but less information than transparent market. It is distinguished from
transparent market with the unavailability of quantity information. Sellers still see all market transactions,
but not the size of those transactions. Opaque treatment is intended to replicate the general market
structure that is found in B2B catalog aggregators, while Transparent and Semi-transparent treatments are
offered as potential adjusted market structures.

Opaque setting (O)
Semi-transparent setting (ST)
Transparent setting (T)
Sellers only see information Sellers see price and trader Sellers see price, quantity, and
about their own transactions. identity of every transaction.
trader identity of every transaction.
Table 1. Description of treatments

Experimental design
The experimental design shown in Table 2 aims to control differences in market parameters, differences
across subjects, differences due to learning effects, and other unknown features of the experiment that
stay constant across treatments. First, we control for differences across cohorts. Different subjects have
different levels of intelligence, motivation, and familiarity with the experimental environment (Kagel and
Roth 1997). If a cohort trades only in one of the three regimes that we design, the differences in their
behavior may reflect the differences of the individuals, rather than what we intend to measure. We avoid
this possible noise by having our cohorts trade in all of the three regimes, as shown in Table 2. Hence, we
can observe the effect of transparency within a given cohort. Second, we control for learning effects. In
laboratory experiments, even the same cohort can behave much differently when repeating a task.
Therefore, learning effects gain dominance especially in complex games since subjects gain experience if
they go through a predetermined sequence of events (Bloomfield and O’hara 1999). We control for such
effects by having each cohort trade in the three settings in different orders.
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Cohort number
1
2
3

Order of settings
ST
T
O

O
ST
T

T
O
ST

Table 2. Experimental design

SIMULATION DESIGN
Design of stationary and non-stationary demand
We analyze market behavior under stationary and non-stationary demand conditions. In both cases, there
are 5 sellers with 3 units of capacity and simulated buyers in each session. We have also run simulations
with 10 sellers and varied the capacity constraints of the sellers. The number of sellers does not affect our
findings. Variation of capacities across sellers also does not make much difference as long as sellers
remain capacity constrained. Hence we report only the results pertaining to 5-seller case in which all
sellers have 3 units of capacity. The supply and demand schedules of the stationary demand market are
illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The design of stationary demand

The non-stationary demand design resembles that of Davis and Holt (1997). Several external factors
may lead to non-stationary demand patterns, including changes in consumer taste, income, or interest
rates. The first period starts with supply and demand schedules of the stationary demand treatment. The
inflationary and then deflationary demand shifts are induced by altering unit values for the buyers. The
demand curve shifts upward by a constant amount for 25 periods and then shifts downward by the same
amount for the remaining 25 periods as illustrated in Figure 2. Hence, market demand ends up where it
was at the first period.
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Figure 2. The design of non-stationary demand
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Description of seller algorithms
Simulated buyer agents trade in Opaque, Semi-transparent and Transparent settings, each of which
provides a different level of information available to sellers. Sellers in all settings can increase or decrease
their prices independently. They can also undercut their competitors by ε, which is drawn from a uniform
distribution in each period. Furthermore, sellers myopically assume that their competitors will post the
same price in the next period in optimizing their posting decisions. Seller surplus in each session is
calculated by multiplying her total quantity sold by the profit made from each unit sold (price-unit cost).
Buyer surplus is the difference between the valuation of a unit by the buyer and its price paid, summed
over all the units purchased by the buyer in a session.
Opaque seller has a two-period memory, thus it sets price according to the outcomes of the last two
periods. It increases price as long as its profit increases by doing so. If buyers penalize such an action,
opaque seller then starts decreasing the price by ε drawn in that period. Whenever profit increases after a
price reduction, the agent tries to increase price again. A similar behavior is also used in the Semitransparent setting, except that now sellers also see the prices of others’ transaction. Hence, agents can
judge whether they can earn more money if they undercut the lowest-priced seller and sell all their
capacity or if they undercut the highest-priced seller and sell a single unit.
Transparent seller has the distinct advantage of being able to calculate its profit assuming that all
others post the same price in the next period. Thus, it either sets the same price or undercuts the price of
the seller at which its expected profit is maximized. This behavior results in early and continuous
clustering of all prices in the market. However, transparent seller also tries higher prices whenever it sells
above a predetermined number of units in two consecutive periods. This may be implemented to explore
more profitable price ranges, which is especially useful in non-stationary demand conditions.
RESULTS
Result 1: Increasing the transparency level of the market results in a higher efficiency. Semi-transparent
market is almost as efficient as transparent market both in the case of stationary and nonstationary
demands, i.e., revelation of quantity information is not very crucial.
With more information revealed in the market, sellers find pricing close to the Competitive
Equilibrium (CE) more profitable, see Table 3 below. Consequently, prices decrease and market
efficiency increases as sellers try to optimize their earnings. An interesting point is that there is not much
difference between Transparent and Semi-transparent settings in terms market efficiency. The efficiency
differential between Transparent and Semi-transparent regimes is less than 3% in both stationary and
nonstationary demand treatments, whereas the differential between Transparent and Opaque market
settings is above 10%. Hence, revealing price information to sellers makes a difference, but additional
information on quantity is not that effective.

Stationary Demand

Nonstationary Demand

Avg. Efficiency

Avg. Price

Avg. Efficiency

Avg. Price

Opaque

74.2%

16.09

75.6%

17.54

Semi-Transparent

84.9%

15.59

86.3%

16.77

Transparent

86.6%

15.49

88.8%

16.60

CE Prediction

100%

14.75

100%

15.85

Table 3. Average market efficiencies in 6 treatments
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Result 2: Posted-offer markets favor sellers.However, increases in transparency level benefit buyers
more. This is especially evident in non-stationary demand treatment where seller profits are nearly
constant across all transparency settings.
Sellers in our simulated markets can extract much more surplus than buyers can do (see Table 4
below). Interestingly, this bias towards sellers decreases as sellers get more information about each
others’ actions. This is because competition gets severe as they track each other, pushing prices down and
increasing buyer surplus. Seller earnings increase very slightly despite decrease in prices.

Stationary Demand

Nonstationary Demand

Average
Buyer Surplus

Average
Seller Surplus

Average
Buyer Surplus

Average
Seller Surplus

Opaque

13.4

23.7

20.6

37.6

Semi-Transparent

17.5

24.9

27.9

37.9

Transparent

18.3

25.0

29.6

38.2

Table 4. Average surpluses in 6 treatments

Result 3: Posted-offer market responds poorly to demand shocks. Sellers in all settings go off the track
when demand changes its trend, which is more pronounced in Opaque setting. Buyers suffer most from
the demand shock.
Sellers in all settings get closer to the CE prediction during successive trading periods until the
demand shock arrives at the 27th period. Then onward, sellers poorly track the CE price level. Tables 5
and 6 below illustrate the effect of the demand shock on the market participants. The interesting point
here is that poor price tracking of sellers do not affect their earnings, but significantly hurts buyer
surpluses. Sellers are initially indifferent between maintaining high price levels and tracking the shift in
demand because selling more at a lower price is identical to selling less at a higher price. Only when the
shift in demand starts to hurt them, do they respond and start decreasing prices. On the other hand, buyer
earnings almost rock bottom as soon as market demand starts its downward movement. Here, we see
another stark example of seller dominance in posted-offer markets.

First 26 periods

Last 25 Periods

% Change

Opaque

24.4

16.6

-32%

Semi-transparent

30.6

25.2

-18%

Transparent

32.2

26.8

-17%

Table 5. Average buyer surplus in nonstationary demand before and after the demand shock

First 26 periods

Last 25 Periods

% Change

Opaque

37.9

37.3

-1%

Semi-transparent

37.9

38.0

0%

Transparent

38.4

37.9

-1%

Table 6. Average seller surplus in nonstationary demand before and after the demand shock
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CONCLUSION
Our results have important implications on the design of B2B marketplaces. Assuming that sellers are not
allowed to collude, buyers strictly prefer a higher level of transparency. Therefore, sellers can attract more
buyers when setting up a market if they announce that their market will reveal information that would
foster competition. The usefulness of revealing information on transaction quantity, however, remains as
an open question. Since the levels of profits are almost identical, sellers may prefer Semi-transparent
design over Transparent one, which may lead to a collusion and a potential investigation by the Federal
Trade Commission. Buyers may also prefer Semi-transparent design if they fear that sellers can collude
when quantity information is available. Thus, we conjecture that catalog sales activity in B2B markets can
accelerate if their design is switched from the widely accepted Opaque form to Semi-transparent regime.
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